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Abstract 
The prominent role of monetary policy in the U.S. interwar 
depression has been conventional wisdom since Friedman and 
Schwartz [1963]. This paper presents evidence on both the 
surprise and the systematic components of monetary policy 
between 1929 and 1933. Doubts surrounding GDP estimates for 
the 1920s would call into question conventional VAR techniques. 
We therefore adopt the FAVAR methodology of Bernanke, Boivin, 
and Eliasz [2005], aggregating a large number of time series into a 
few factors and inserting these into a monetary policy VAR. We 
work in a Bayesian framework and apply MCMC methods to 
obtain the posteriors. Employing the generalized sign restriction 
approach toward identification of Amir Ahmadi and Uhlig [2008], 
we find the effects of monetary policy shocks to have been 
moderate. To analyze the systematic policy component, we back 
out the monetary policy reaction function and its response to 
aggregate supply and demand shocks. Results broadly confirm 
the Friedman/Schwartz view about restrictive monetary policy, but 
indicate only moderate effects. We further analyze systematic 
policy through conditional forecasts of key time series at critical 
junctures, taken with and without the policy instrument. Effects are 
again quite moderate. Our results caution against a predominantly 
monetary interpretation of the Great Depression. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Beginning with the seminal contribution of Friedman and Schwartz 
[1963], the Great Depression has traditionally been associated with 
restrictive monetary policy. In 1928, the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, then the leading institution in U.S. monetary policy, responded to 
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the stock market boom with interest rate hikes from 3.5 % in January to   
5 % in September. Between July and October of 1929, it raised its 
discount rate by another percentage point. After the October stock market 
crash, the discount rate was reduced in several steps to reach 1.5 % in 
June 1931. However, given the rapid decline in price levels, ex-post real 
interest rates remained high. Monetary authorities also failed to intervene 
in the banking crisis that unfolded beginning in December of 1930, and 
interest rates increased again after Britain’s departure from the Gold 
Standard in October, 1931. 
This paper is about submitting the role of monetary policy in the 
Great Depression hypothesis to empirical test. This task is a complex 
one, as several different channels of monetary policy transmission during 
the depression have been proposed. The strongest form of the paradigm, 
expounded by Schwartz [1981], states that both the initial recessionary 
impulse and the later deepening of the recession were largely caused by 
the Federal Reserve. The original position of Friedman and Schwartz 
[1963] centred more strongly on the role of monetary policy in deepening 
the slump. This weaker version of the monetary paradigm is also 
consistent with the emphasis placed on bank panics by Bernanke 
[1983,1985] and others. Bernanke’s research focused on financial 
channels of monetary policy transmission, emphasizing the role of 
information asymmetries and participation constraints in debtor/creditor 
relations, as well as of debt deflation. Bernanke and Carey [1996] also 
looked at nominal wage stickiness as an alternative mechanism of 
monetary policy transmission during the depression. 
In the light of these various proposed transmission mechanisms, 
traditional VAR analysis soon reaches its limits, as it only allows for a 
small number of time series to model the pertinent dynamics of the 
money/income causation. One alternative that has been pursued in the 
recent literature was to obtain counterfactuals from well-specified DSGE 
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models of the Great Depression that focus on one specific monetary 
transmission mechanism. Bordo, Erceg, and Evans [2000] specify a 
DSGE model with sticky wages, finding evidence in favour of a nominal 
wage rigidity channel of monetary policy transmission. Christiano, Motto 
and Rostagno [2003] propose a DSGE model with a permanent increase 
in liquidity preference during the depression, and argue that given this 
preference shift, easy monetary policy a la Friedman and Schwartz would 
have mitigated most of the slump. 
However, non-monetary interpretations using DSGE techniques 
seem to have worked equally well in modelling the interwar depression. 
Cole and Ohanian [2005] specified a model of collective wage bargaining 
to argue that real wage rigidity under the New Deal prevented a more 
complete recovery from the depression after 1933. Combining 
monopolistic competition in product markets with search frictions in the 
labor market, Ebell and Ritschl [2007] argued that the Great Depression 
could be viewed as an equilibrium shift, induced by high wage policies 
under the Hoover administration. In a model of international business 
cycle transmission in the Great Depression, Cole, Ohanian, and Leung 
[2005] examined monetary policy and productivity shocks alongside each 
other, and found only a minor role for monetary shocks in explaining the 
slump. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [2007] modelled the Great 
Depression using a neoclassical business cycle accounting framework 
with frictions. On the other extreme of the spectrum of non-monetary 
models, Harrison and Weder [2005] calibrate a sunspot model of investor 
behaviour, which finds strong evidence for an investment-led downturn 
that was unrelated to monetary policy. Hence, existing research offers a 
whole menu of interpretations which all seem consistent with the data, 
although they partly exclude each other. 
This is what motivates the approach taken in the present paper. 
Compared to existing research on the Great Depression, we aim to 
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impose less structure and at the same time analyze a richer dataset. We 
start out from parsimonious yet informative prior assumptions on the 
effects of monetary policy. We gear our estimation toward exploiting the 
information on the common components of business cycle movements in 
a large cross section of time series. To this end, we employ the factor-
augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) techniques introduced into 
monetary policy by, among others, Bernanke and Boivin [2003], Stock 
and Watson [2005] and Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz [2005] (henceforth 
BBE). The idea behind this can be interpreted as augmenting the 
information content in a VAR by a two-step procedure. In a first step, the 
common dynamics in a large panel of time series are identified using 
dynamic factor model (DFM) techniques as developed by Geweke [1977] 
and Sims and Sargent [1977]. In a second step, the causality between a 
properly chosen policy instrument and some representative measure of 
economic activity is examined in a traditional VAR, including the factors 
as the relevant description of the underlying economic dynamics. 
Estimation is either in two steps, employing principal-component 
techniques for DFM part and Maximum Likelihood for the FAVAR, or 
simultaneous by Bayesian likelihood methods or suitable numerical 
approximations. In the present paper, we adhere to the Bayesian 
approach, which allows us to exploit the information on the observables in 
the VAR specification more completely. 
Both traditional VAR analysis and FAVARs for U.S. data have 
obtained significant but quantitatively small effects of monetary policy on 
output. In a long-term study on the U.S. since the 1930s, Sims [1999] 
finds that monetary policy on average explains around 12 % of forecast 
error variance in output. Using the FAVAR technique, Amir Ahmadi and 
Uhlig [2008] report a variance explanation of less than 14 % for industrial 
output and roughly 10 % for unemployment, order flows, and capacity 
utilization, evaluated at a 48-months horizon. 
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VAR evidence on the Great Depression is sparse. Ritschl and 
Woitek [2000] employ time-varying techniques on four different 
specifications of the monetary transmission mechanism and find that 
monetary policy explains less than 5 % of output forecast error variance. 
They also find the forecasting performance of their VARs to be poor. This 
suggests that a traditional monetary policy VAR, run with the imperfect 
aggregate data available for the interwar period, might not be able to 
capture the business cycle dynamics of the Great Depression very well. 
Given the limitations to data quality in the interwar period, working in a 
FAVAR framework thus seems particularly promising, as the underlying 
DFM aggregates information included in a large panel of disaggregate 
time series. The statistical aggregation procedure implicit in the FAVAR 
presents an alternative to historical monetary statistics and reconstructed 
national accounts with their unavoidable interpolations and inaccuracies. 
The aim of the present paper is to track the effects of U.S. 
monetary policy during the interwar years in the data-rich environment 
provided by the FAVAR approach, and to evaluate them against the post-
war evidence collected in previous studies. The Friedman/Schwartz 
[1963] hypothesis on the monetary causes of the Great Depression would 
suggest that the effects of interwar monetary policy were significant and 
certainly larger than the rather modest estimates obtained for post-war 
U.S. data. Any findings that suggest only minor effects of monetary policy 
would then have to be interpreted as cautioning against a primarily 
monetary explanation of the Great Depression. 
The task at hand is a double one. On the one hand, we follow the 
standard approach to policy analysis in a VAR, calculating impulse 
response sequences and forecast error variance decompositions under 
identifying assumptions about the correlation structure of the VAR 
residuals. The implicit assumption behind this approach is the neutrality of 
anticipated monetary policy changes, i.e. of movements along the central 
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bank’s reaction function. On the other, we also attempt to trace possible 
systematic effects of monetary policy, which would be present under a 
wider set of frictions that allow for (however short-lived) deviations from 
non-neutrality of movements along the monetary policy reaction function 
itself. In a VAR, such systematic effects would be identified through 
Granger causality of monetary policy for other variables of interest. We 
implement this by taking Bayesian forecasts of key economic indicators 
from FAVARs with and without past realizations of the policy instrument. 
Improvements of the forecast in the presence of the policy instrument 
relative to the baseline would then be an indication of possible systematic 
policy effects, while the sign of the correction would indicate the 
expansionary or recessionary stance of systematic policy. This is the 
closest we can get to providing a test of monetary policy effects in the 
spirit of Friedman and Schwartz’ [1963] hypothesis. Furthermore we 
identify the reaction of different policy instruments to aggregate supply 
and demand shocks tracing the systematic reaction of the monetary 
authority to changes in the economy. 
We proceed in several steps. Section (2) presents the basic 
econometric framework, which closely follows the Bayesian version of 
BBE’s FAVAR model. Section (3) describes the estimation procedure and 
Section (4) discusses the model fit. Section (5) provides results for the 
stochastic component of monetary policy empirical results for policy, 
obtaining shocks from the generalized sign restriction identification 
approach described in Amir Ahmadi and Uhlig [2008]. Section (6) 
analyzes the policy reaction to identified aggregate supply and demand 
shocks. Section (7) looks at possible effects of systematic monetary 
policy, examining conditional forecasts of key time series with and without 
the policy instrument at critical junctures. Section (8) concludes. 
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2. The Model 
The key idea behind dynamic factor models is to parsimoniously 
represent the co-movements in a large set of cross-sectional data by only 
a limited number of unobserved latent factors .The dynamic factor model 
(henceforth DFM) allows dynamics in both the common component - 
represented by these factors and their respective factor loadings - and the 
variable-specific idiosyncratic component. The factor-augmented vector 
autoregression (henceforth FAVAR) model is a hybrid between a DFM 
and the standard structural VAR model: a joint VAR is specified for some 
series of interest   and some factors  that are extracted from a 
large panel of informational time series ctX .  The working hypothesis o
FAVAR model is that while a narrow set of variables , notably the policy 
instrument of the central bank, are perfectly observable and have 
pervasive effects on the economy, the underlying dynamics of the 
economy are less perfectly observable, and hence a VAR in just a few 
key variables would potentially suffer from omitted variable bias. As 
increasing the size of a VAR is impractical due to problems of 
dimensionality, the FAVAR approach aims to extract the common 
dynamics from a wide set of informational indicator series , and to 
include these in the VAR, represented by a small number of factors  
This approach is well suited for structural analysis such as impulse 
response analysis and variance decomposition (in particular for the 
problem at hand). For the estimation procedure the model has to be cast 
in a state-space representation. The informational variables  included 
in the observation equation are assumed to be driven by observable 
variables with pervasive effects on the economy (e.g. the central bank’s 
policy instrument), , a small number of unobservable common factors, 
y
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c
tf , which together represent the main ”driving forces” of the economy, 
and an idiosyncratic component , i.e cte
 
 
Here and denote the matrix of factor loadings of the factors and the fλ Yλ
policy instrument with dimension ]cc K[N × and ][ Yc KN ×  respectively. 
The error term  has mean 0 and covariance  , which is assumed to be 
diagonal. Hence the error terms of the observable variables are mutually 
uncorrelated. The FAVAR state equation represents the joint dynamics of 
factors and the observable policy variables (   
c
te R
), t
c ftf
 
where   is the time t  reduced form shock and   the time ftu
f
tv t structural 
shock, with the contemporaneous relations represented through matrix 
. The dimensions are , ][ 1×K ][ 1A ×K  and ][ KK ×  respectively, where      
 denotes the total number of factors including the perfectly ycK N+K =
observables ones. In the subsequent estimation we consider the following 
finite order VAR(P) approximation of the unobserved state dynamics 
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 2.1 Factor Identification  
 Identification of the model against rotational indeterminacy requires 
normalization and additional restrictions. We follow the approach of 
Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz [2005] and normalize the upper [ ]  
block of to the identity matrix and restrict the upper  
cc KK ×
fλ [ ]yNcK ×  block of 
to only contain zeros.yλ 1 
 
 
3. Estimation and Identification of Shocks 
3.1 Estimation 
We cast the state space model of the previous section into a 
stacked first order Markov state space representation. Estimation is 
facilitated via a multi-move Gibbs sampler which involves the Kalman 
smoother for evaluating the likelihood of the unobserved factors. Given 
the sequence of sampled factors we draw the parameters via posterior 
sampling. In particular we employ a Gibbs sampler for the two blocks of 
parameters, the first referring to the parameters of the observation 
equation and the second block contains the parameter space of the state 
equation. The above state space representation can be rewritten as 
 
where  
                                   
1 Note that this approach is over-identified. However, it is easy to implement and does 
not require further sign restrictions on the factor loadings or further normalizations of 
the covariance matrices of the residuals. Alternative restrictions and normalization for 
the factor identification are reported e.g. in Geweke and Zhou [1996]. The analysis and 
comparison of the different approaches to factor identification goes beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
 9
 where  and .  For the 
companion form of the model we define 
 and 
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where the  s and  Q  have dimension  '0 ][ KK ×  and  ][ PKPK ×  
respectively.  We define  ][ .00Kλ≡Λ  The final companion form results 
in  
 
The parameter space to be estimated is given by  )( uefy QRb ,,,,λλθ =  
and the history of the observed data and the latent factors is given by   
 and  respectively. Hence the estimation 
algorithm can be simplified and summarized by two steps relying on the 
blocking scheme. First we initialize the sampler by finding starting values 
( )TT XXX ,,1 K= )( TT FFF ,,1 K=
)( 0u0 ,e Q0000 ,,, yf Rbλλθ =  and )( 0F   Given a set of initial values  ( )00 ,Fθ  we 
sample the parameters conditional on the data, and afterwards sample 
the latent factors given the new set of parameters and data. 
 
we cycle through this procedure sufficiently many times until the target 
distribution has been empirically approximated. An initial number of draws 
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will be discarded as burn in. To reduce the dependency of the posterior 
sampler and to reduce the autocorrelation of the chain a thinning 
parameter  1≥κ  is introduced. Hence only every thκ  draw after the burn 
in is stored.  Details about the implementation and specification are 
reported in section (4) on the empirical application. Algorithm (1) contains 
a pseudo code of the employed algorithm for illustrative purposes. A 
detailed technical derivation and description of the posterior sampling 
technique can be found in appendix (A). 
 
 
 3.2 Identification of Shocks 
 One objective of this paper is to analyze the role of monetary policy 
shocks during the interwar US Great Depression. This involves identifying 
the non-systematic part of monetary policy. The traditional approach in 
our model framework would be the Cholesky identification, where the 
policy instrument is ordered last in the FAVAR equation. Then, the policy 
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instrument reacts contemporaneously to the other variables through the 
common factors but not vice versa. As shown in Amir Ahmadi and Uhlig 
[2008] this approach is flawed and produces unreasonable results for 
post-war US data2. In this paper we therefore follow the methodology of 
Amir Ahmadi and Uhlig [2008]. Generalizing results of Uhlig [2005] to the 
dynamic factor model, this approach identifies policy through restrictions 
on the sign of the impulse response functions for specified periods.3  
Identification of structural shocks through imposing sign restrictions 
is based on assumptions about the sign of the impulse response 
functions of key macroeconomic variables. Such restrictions should 
represent ‘conventional wisdom’ derived from economic theory that most 
researchers can agree on4. Sign restrictions turn out to be particularly 
well suited to the FAVAR model, as they are straightforward to impose on 
a large number of series.  
The structural FAVAR is obtained by inserting (2.4) into the 
reduced form version in (3.2): 
 
 
The crucial step is to represent the one-step ahead prediction error as 
a linear combination of suitably defined orthogonalized structural shocks 
(see Uhlig [2005]. For this, assume the fundamental innovations are 
mutually independent and have unit variance, 
f
tv
 
                                   
2 We also experimented with the traditional Cholesky decomposition, and encountered 
similar problems on an even larger scale. 
3 Implementations of signs restrictions in similar models can also be found e.g. in 
Mönch [2005] and Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha [2007]. 
4 The sign restriction approach which was introduced to the SVAR literature by Dywer 
[1997], Faust [1998], Canova and de Nicolo [2002], and Uhlig [2005]. 
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The restriction on A  then emerges from the covariance structure of the 
reduced form factor innovation, which leads to: 
 
Following Uhlig [2005] we define an impulse vector as a column of matrix  
.A   Such a vector can be obtained from any decomposition, e.g. the 
Cholesky decomposition, of the VCV matrix of the factor residual matrix  
ĀĀ’ =   uQ
Definition 1 The vector     is called an impulse vector, if there is 
some matrix 
Ka ℜ∈
A , so that  uQAA ='    and so that   is a column of a A   
 According to Proposition 1 of Uhlig [2005,pp. 18], any impulse 
vector can be characterized as follows.  Let  ĀĀ’ =  be the Cholesky 
decomposition.  Then  is an impulse vector if and only if there is some    
uQ
a
−K dimensional vector  α of unit length so that  =a Āα . Given the 
impulse vector, let  r    be the vector response at horizon  to the 
-th shock in a Cholesky decomposition of    Then the impulse response  
  for    is simply given by  
( )s Kk ℜ∈ s
k
(sra
uQ
) a
 
For estimation consider the companion form of the state space in (3.4)-
(3.5) 
 
To compute the impulse response vector   let   a ]'0,'[ )1(,1 −= PKaa  and 
compute  
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to get the impulse response of factor k to an impulse in  at horizon a s . 
Note that  is the vector of impulse response functions of all factors to 
an impulse vector  at horizon 
( )sra
a s . As a second step we have to compute 
the impulse response functions of the single variables by combining the 
respective factor loading with  ( )sra  accordingly.  This requires us to 
compute  
 
where   is the respective  -th  row vector of the factor loading matrix. 
We set the sign restriction on the shape of the individual impulse 
response functions according to the following assumption: 
nΛ n
 Assumption 1 A (contractionary) monetary policy impulse 
vector is an impulse vector a so that the individual impulse response 
functions to a of price and non-borrowed reserves are not positive and the 
impulse responses for the policy instrument such as the short term 
discount rate (controllable monetary aggregate, e.g. M1) is not negative 
(positive), for a specified horizon Ss ,,0K= . 
Table (1) provides a summary of the identifying sign restrictions we 
impose. 
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4. Specification and Model Fit 
4.1 Data and Model Specification 
 All data are taken from the NBER’s macroeconomic history 
database. Most of these data are contemporary and were collected for 
the business cycle dating project of Burns and Mitchell [1947]. Our 
dataset includes a total of 164 time series, ranging from industrial 
production to order flows and housing start-ups, agricultural, raw material, 
and finished goods prices, measures of deposits, savings, and liquidity in 
the banking system, as well as interest rates on call money, commercial 
paper, and various medium and long term bonds. Table 2 in Appendix B 
provides the details along with the NBER macroeconomic database 
classification codes. To achieve stationarity, some of the data series were 
transformed into logarithmic first differences. 
 We estimate the model using the data in monthly frequency for the 
US from 1919:02 until 1939:02. This period covers the slide into and 
recovery from the recession of 1920-21, as well as the downturn of the 
Great Depression. In the following, we report the results from a FAVAR 
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model with  factors and  4=cK P= 12  lags5 on a dataset including one 
policy instrument and N=164 informational variables.6 
 
 4.2 Model Fit 
We performed several checks to see whether the model represents 
the data in an adequate manner. The first obvious check is to obtain the 
goodness of fit of the observation equation (2.1) for each series  cX  
Results are listed in Table (3) below. As can be seen, the overall fit is 
high; the factors seem to capture the common components of the interwar 
business cycle well. Thus, a VAR in these factors or common 
components should not suffer from omitted variable bias. This implies that 
adding individual series to the VAR in eq. (2.3) above will not alter the 
shape of any impulse response functions substantially.7  Upon increasing 
the number of factors, the model fit did not change much, and the 
subsequent VAR analysis remained basically unaffected. 
 
 4.3 Convergence Diagnostics 
To ensure that the results are based on converged simulation 
chains that represent the respective target distribution and not only e.g. 
some local mode, we applied a battery of further convergence diagnostics 
for the simulated parameters based on the Gibbs sampler. The respective 
diagnostics are not a guarantee for convergence but can reduce the 
uncertainty. The diagnostics we employed are widespread in the MCMC 
                                   
5 We tried several versions with different lag length (up to 13), without much change in 
the results. 
6 We experimented with including more factors, and found that little information was 
added by increasing the dimension of the system. This is broadly consistent with the 
results in Stock and Watson [2005], who report an optimal choice of seven factors for 
their post-war U.S. data set of 132 series with this methodology. 
7 If this property holds strictly, the factor model is termed exact. If including individual 
series adds to the information content significantly but with small coefficients, the factor 
model is approximate. See Stock and Watson [2005] for a survey of the implications 
and for testing strategies. 
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literature, and are reported in Appendix D. We also checked the precision 
of the sampler by plotting the associated error bands. An example for the 
extracted factors covering the 95 % probability band is given in Figure (1). 
 
 
5. The Surprise Component of Monetary Policy 
We follow standard procedure in VAR analysis and obtain impulse 
responses to identified monetary policy shocks, employing the FAVAR 
model as a representation of the monetary transmission mechanism. As 
mentioned above, our attempts to obtain economically meaningful 
impulse responses from a Cholesky decomposition of the FAVAR model 
failed8.  Hence we resort to Uhlig’s [2005] sign restriction strategy. We 
implement this by imposing, among others, a sign restriction on the 
response of the CPI to a contractionary monetary shock9. 
There has been some uncertainty as to which monetary policy 
instrument was actually used at the time. The discussions in Friedman 
and Schwartz [1963] suggest a role for targeting monetary aggregates, 
but also leave a role for interest rates. We present results for five model 
specifications corresponding to candidate policy instruments. These 
include two interest rates – the Federal Discount Rate and the rate on 
prime commercial paper – and three monetary aggregates – high 
powered money M0, as well as M1 and M2. 
In spite of the restrictions we impose, the results are not 
encouraging. The responses of the FRB index of manufacturing to a 
contractionary interest rate shock in the Discount Rate model follow a 
rotated S-shaped pattern, being near-significantly negative both at the 
one year and after the three year lag, and weakly positive in between 
(see Figure 4 below). The contribution of a contractionary discount rate 
                                   
8 Results are available upon request. 
9 A detailed list of sign restrictions imposed for identification can be found in table (1) 
 17
policy shock to the forecast error variance of industrial production remains 
below 10 % over four years (see Table 4 for a tabulation of all variance 
decompositions reported here). Choosing the Commercial Paper Rate as 
the relevant policy instrument instead, the impulse response function 
remains in negative territory throughout (see Figure 5). However, the 
values are insignificant, and the contribution of the policy shock to the 
forecast error variance of FRB manufacturing remains solidly below 10 %. 
This is pretty much what Uhlig [2005] found for U.S. postwar data.  
Model specifications with monetary aggregates as the policy 
instrument fare slightly better. Responses to a shock in high-powered 
money M0 as the policy instrument are again S-shaped, veering from 
negative into positive and back into negative (Figure 6). The same S-
shaped pattern is obtained for responses to shocks in M2, except that the 
response in the second year goes to zero instead of into positive (Figure 
8). Responses to shocks in M1 look well behaved for the first year but 
then rapidly lose force (Figure 7). The variance decompositions show that 
responses to M0 and M1 shocks contributed between 15 and 20 % to the 
forecast error variance of FRB manufacturing output. For M2 as the policy 
instrument, the explained variance of FRB manufacturing remains well 
below 10 %, averaging between 6 and 7 % over the four-year horizon that 
we look at. This seems close to the values reported by BBE [2005] for 
postwar industrial output.10 
Drawing the results of this section together, we find that the 
responses of the real economy to contractionary monetary shocks are in 
generally weak and, pathologically, change their signs. This result obtains 
under four of five different specifications of the monetary policy instrument 
and two different identification schemes for the innovations in the VAR. 
Still the best results we obtain for responses to shocks in M1, which do 
                                   
10 A full set of impulse response functions for all series of the dataset is available 
from the authors upon request. 
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not exhibit sign changes and which explain around 20 % of the forecast 
error variance of manufacturing output. This is in line with postwar data. A 
FAVAR model drawing on rich data from the interwar period does not find 
evidence for unusual, pervasive negative effects of contractionary 
monetary policy during the Great Depression. 
 
 
6. The Systematic Component of Monetary Policy 
6.1 The Policy Reaction Function 
Our analysis so far has been agnostic about the choice of monetary 
policy instruments, and has worked with several candidate policy 
instruments instead. This section attempts to identify the reaction function 
of monetary policy during the Great Depression. To this end, we obtain 
the responses of the respective candidate monetary policy instrument to 
aggregate demand and supply shocks, using the same techniques as 
before. In this way, we can directly measure if and how the monetary 
authority reacted to change in output and prices. 
 
 6.2 Aggregate Supply Shocks 
 6.2.1 Full Sample Analysis  
 As laid out before, we again employ a sign restrictions approach to 
identify supply and demand shocks. We identify a positive aggregate 
supply shock by restricting the response of CPI inflation to be negative 
and the response of the FRB index of manufacturing to be positive for a 
horizon of 6 months. Results indicate only weak systematic responses. 
For the observation period as a whole, the instruments in the Commercial 
Paper Rate model (Figure 9) and Federal Discount Rate models (Figure 
10) exhibit moves in the wrong direction, with no visible effect on high 
powered money M0 or on M1. In the Federal Discount Rate model, M2 
would even increase significantly, indicating monetary accommodation of 
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the positive supply shock. The monetary targeting models fare slightly 
better: with M0 or M1 as the monetary instrument (in Figures 11 and 12, 
respectively), there is a clear-cut negative response of M2 to the positive 
supply shock. However, there is no clear response of the respective 
candidate monetary instrument themselves, casting doubt on the 
underlying money multiplier mechanism. Assuming instead that M2 itself 
is the monetary instrument (in Figure 13), we do obtain strong interest 
rate responses, however the response of M2 itself veers into positive after 
just a few months. 
 On the basis of these results, it would seem safe to exclude 
inflation targeting through interest rates from the list of possible policy 
functions of the Federal Reserve. In principle, the better performance of 
the monetary specifications provides some support for the Friedman and 
Schwartz [1963] monetary targeting view. However, the connection 
between the M0 or M1 and the monetary M2 target seems less than 
clear-cut, and the responses of M2 are plagued by sign problems. 
Looking at the observation period as a whole, the evidence for systematic 
responses of monetary policy seems rather mixed. 
 
 6.2.2 Subsample Analysis 
 Turning to the analysis of subsample periods we find that a 
somewhat different picture emerges. The subsamples are five critical 
junctures during the observation period. The first includes the information 
in the FAVAR as of September 1929, the last month before the New York 
stock market crash. The second includes all data until November 1930, 
the last month before the first wave of banking panics. The third extends 
to June 1931, just before the German debt and reparations moratorium, 
which triggered Britain’s departure from the Gold Standard. The fourth 
extends to August 1931, the last month before Britain indeed broke away 
from the Gold Standard. The last is based on information up until 
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February 1933, the month before Roosevelt’s bank closure and the formal 
inception of the New Deal. For the Federal Discount Rate model, we find 
an increase in short term interest rates in response to a positive supply 
shock for up to 2 years. Turning to the three monetary aggregate models, 
there is now a clear-cut response of the short term interest rates for all 
sub-periods except for the first one. 
 The results from the subsample analysis suggests that systematic 
monetary policy did respond increasingly to supply shocks. The 
responses of the policy instruments were feeble until 1929 but become 
more pronounced as time progressed and the slump deepened. Still, the 
responses we observe are not free of sign problems, indicating that the 
identifying restrictions may still not be strong enough. Results for all 
subperiods are provided in Appendix E, available upon request from the 
authors. 
 
 6.3 Aggregate Demand Shocks 
 6.3.1 Full Sample Analysis 
 As outlined above, we identify a negative demand shock through 
imposing a negative response of both FRB manufacturing output and CPI 
inflation for 6 months. For the full observation period, the response of the 
policy instruments to a negative aggregate demand shock is insignificant. 
Assuming an interest rate to be the policy instrument, short term interest 
rates slightly decrease following a negative demand shock. However, this 
holds only with a high degree of uncertainty. The specifications with 
monetary aggregates as instruments perform poorly, indicating no 
monetary response at all or even a slight degree of accommodation, as in 
the case of the M1 model. Results are reported in Appendix D in Figures 
14 through 18. 
 
 
 21
 6.3.2 Subsample Analysis 
 Turning to the subsample analysis, we find that the response of 
interest rates to an adverse demand shock became more pronounced 
over time. This result holds for all the five models considered. Again, 
there are sign problems in the responses of the monetary aggregates. 
Results for the subsample periods, provided in Appendix E, can be 
requested from the authors. 
 
7. Any Effects of Systematic Monetary Policy? 
This section ventures into monetary policy effects that might go 
beyond mere on-off surprises. Under rational expectations and a minimal 
set of frictions, as is standard in the surprise Phillips curve paradigm 
since Lucas [1972], systematic monetary policy along a reaction function 
should be neutral and have no real effects. Any monetary policy effects 
beyond one-time surprises would entail deviations from rational 
expectations, or possibly a tighter set of constraints on the pricing 
mechanism. Such deviations, e.g. Friedman's [1968] backward-looking 
adaptive expectations approach, appear to come closest in spirit to the 
original Friedman and Schwartz [1963] hypothesis.  
 
In a reduced form model like the FAVAR we specified, estimates of 
the model parameters  are obtained conditional on 
the prevailing monetary policy regime , where  is the monetary 
policy instrument. This would render policy evaluation through 
counterfactual variations of the policy sequence meaningless, Lucas 
[1976]. The only permissible statement is therefore about the information 
content of the observed policy sequence, conditional on the agents' 
information set at time 
),,,,( ue
fy QRbλλθ =
mf }{ to m
t . Under rational expectations, only the 
innovations to policy matter. Hence, historical realizations of the monetary 
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policy instrument should not influence agents' expectations about the 
state of the economy, , i.e. ystf +
( fE
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In principle, both sides of this equation can be evaluated 
separately, and their empirical forecasting power be compared. This is 
the estimation strategy adopted in this section. By standard arguments 
about reverse causality, higher forecasting precision of the LHS of this 
equation (i.e, when monetary policy history is included) is not 
sufficient for the presence of systematic policy effects. Rational 
expectations imply, however, that it is a necessary condition: if upon 
including past realizations of the monetary policy instrument, no 
improvement in forecasting power is found, it seems safe to rule out 
systematic policy effects, as predicted by the rational expectations 
approach.  
t
o
mf }{
In what follows we present forecasts of a few key series conditional 
on information at time t  for five critical junctures during the Great 
Depression. The first includes the information set as of September 1929, 
the last month before the New York stock market crash. The second 
includes the data until November 1930, the last month before the first 
wave of banking panics. The third extends to June 1931, just before the 
Austrian/German financial crisis. The fourth extends to August 1931, the 
last month before Britain broke away from the Gold Standard. The last 
forecast is based on information up until February 1933, the month before 
Roosevelt's bank closure and the formal inception of the New Deal. For 
each of these observation subperiods, we obtain a baseline conditional 
forecast from the FAVAR model excluding all of the candidate monetary 
policy instruments. For the same subperiods, we also obtain five more 
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conditional forecasts from the FAVAR, each including one of the five 
candidate monetary policy instruments. The forecast error variance from 
these predictions can then be compared to the baseline. 
Figure 19 shows the results from the baseline forecasts. As can be 
seen from the forecasts of both FRB manufacturing output and orders of 
machinery (a leading indicator of equipment investment), neither the 
onset of the recession nor its further deepening are very well captured by 
this non-monetary baseline. The baseline from late 1929 does predict a 
major deflationary episode, but the forecasts taken at later times all 
wrongly predict an inflationary correction. These non-monetary FAVARs 
appear to bear out conventional wisdom about the early phase of the 
slump, as laid out in Friedman and Schwartz [1963] and Bernanke [1983], 
or in Temin [1989]: the sharp downturn after 1929 was itself not 
predictable. They also broadly confirm work of Dominguez, Fair, and 
Shapiro [1988] who found the depression difficult to predict from non-
monetary VARs. 
Figures 20 and 21 provide forecasts including the commercial 
paper rate and the discount rate as policy instruments, respectively. The 
first group of forecasts underpredicts output at very short intervals, 
generating scenarios of sharp downward spikes and swift recoveries. The 
forecasts from the discount rate model, in contrast, overpredict output at 
short intervals. Both group of forecasts broadly agree on predicting 
inflation.  
Figures 22 and 23 suggest that FAVARs including M0 or M1 are 
somewhat better at predicting output at short intervals than the interest 
rate models; they also appear to perform better than the non-monetary 
baseline. This does not hold true for the M2 model, which does not 
perform better than the non-monetary baseline. Again, all forecasts agree 
on predicting imminent inflation at most of the critical junctures of the 
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Great Depression. A central bank employing any of these forecasts would 
not have regarded its stance during the Great Depression as deflationary. 
Examination of the root mean square forecast errors in Tables 5 to 
8 confirms this impression. At all horizons, forecasts of output from the 
M0 and M1 model outperform the non-monetary baseline. This does not 
hold for the interest rate specifications as well as the M2 model. 
Unsurprisingly, inclusion of any of the five candidate policy instruments in 
the FAVAR outperforms the baseline in predicting CPI inflation. Still, it is 
remarkable that none of the FAVARs predict the protracted deflationary 
process witnessed in the Great Depression.  
 This evidence is again consistent with conventional wisdom, see in 
particular Hamilton [1987, 1992]. There appears to be no evidence of 
learning or updating about the deflationary process; the priors in the 
forecast of CPI appear impossible to overturn. Taking this further, if the 
FAVAR aggregates the information available to monetary decision 
makers at the time, their lack of worries about easing monetary policy 
becomes apparent: given the strongly inflationary signals that monetary 
policy appeared to be emitting, no further action seemed necessary or 
even useful. Monetary policy in the conventional sense had lost traction in 
1929, and apparently die not regain it before well into the 1930s. 
Drawing the evidence from this section together, there is some 
evidence that past realizations of monetary policy help to improve output 
forecasts during the depression. This is particularly true for M0 and M1 as 
candidate policy instruments, which beat the non-monetary baseline 
forecasts. Systematic monetary policy was perhaps more informative 
about the state of the U.S. economy during the depression than would be 
compatible with rational expectations. However, even the forecasts 
including past realizations of monetary policy are far from satisfactory: 
monetary policy regimes do not appear to explain the Great Depression.  
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8. Conclusion 
Recent research has attempted to increase the explanatory power 
of vector autoregressions for monetary policy analysis by drawing on the 
common components in a large panel of time series. In this paper, we 
employed the factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) 
methodology of Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz [2005] to reassess the 
effects of monetary policy on the U.S. economy during the interwar Great 
Depression. We use a panel of 164 time series, taken from the 
macroeconomic history database of the NBER, to provide information on 
the common component of the U.S. business cycle during the interwar 
period. We specified FAVARs based on this information set for five 
different specifications of the monetary policy instrument. 
 To avoid pervasive price puzzles, we were forced to employ a sign 
restrictions approach. In spite of the identifying assumptions we make, we 
find that while monetary policy was clearly not neutral, its effects on the 
real economy were mixed and changed signs. Also, we find the overall 
contribution of monetary policy to the variance explanation of real 
variables to be as low as in the postwar period, if not lower.  
We obtained the responses of the various candidate policy 
instruments to identified demand and supply shocks in order to identify 
the reaction function of monetary policy. In general we found these 
responses to be weak; however there is evidence of an increased 
responsiveness to both real and nominal shocks as the depression 
deepened. We also tested for deviations from the rational expectations 
paradigm in order to see if systematic policy effects were present. While 
there is some evidence of such effects, they are again far from clear-cut 
and pervasive. At the present stage, we conclude that while monetary 
policy certainly played some role in the interwar depression, there is only 
scant support for the traditional hypothesis that the Great Depression was 
mostly a monetary phenomenon. 
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Appendix
A Bayesian Inference based on MCMC
A.1 Inference
Bayesian analysis treats the parameters of the model as random vari-
ables. We are interested in inference on the parameter space Θ =(
Λ f ,Λy,R, vec(Φ),Σν
)
and the factors {Ft}Tt=1. Multi move Gibbs Sampling
alternately samples the parameters θ and the factors Ft, given the data. We use
the multi move version of the Gibbs sampler because this approach allows us
as, a first step, to estimate the unobserved common components, namely the
factors via the Kalman filtering technique conditional on the given hyperparam-
eters, and as a second step calculate the hyperparameters of the model given
the factors via the Gibbs sampler in the respective blocking.
Let X˜T = (X1, . . . ,XT) and F˜T = (F1, . . . , FT) define the histories of X
and F, respectively. The task is to derive the posterior densities which require to
empirically approximate the marginal posterior densities of F and Θ:
p(F˜T) =
∫
p(F˜T, θ)dΘ
p(Θ) =
∫
p(F˜T,Θ)dF˜T
where
p(F˜T,Θ)
is the joint posterior density and the integrals are taken with respect to the sup-
ports of Θ and FT respectively. The procedure applied to obtain the empirical
approximation of the posterior distribution is the previously mentioned multi move
version of the Gibbs sampling technique by Carter and Kohn [1994] which is also
applied by BBE11.
A.2 Choosing the Starting Values Θ0
In general one can start the iteration cycle with any arbitrary randomly drawn
set of parameters, as the joint and marginal empirical distributions of the gen-
erated parameters will converge at an exponential rate to its joint and marginal
11For more details see Kim and Nelson [1999], Eliasz [2005] and BBE [2005]
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target distributions as S → ∞. This has been shown by Geman and Geman
[1984]. We will try several starting values in order to assure that our model
has converged and does not depend on the choice of initial values. We follow
the advice of Eliasz [2005] that one should judiciously select the starting values
in the framework of large dimensional models. In case of large cross-sections,
highly dimensional likelihoods make irregularities more likely. This can reduce
the number of draws relevant for convergence and hence saves time, which in
a computer-intensive statistical framework is of great relevance. We apply the
first step estimates of principal component analysis to select the starting values.
Since Gelman and Rubin [1992] have shown that a single chain of the Gibbs
sampler might give a ”false sense of security ”, it has become common practice
to try out different starting values, at best from a randomly (over)dispersed set of
parameters, and then check the convergence verifying that they lead to similar
empirical distributions.
A.3 Conditional density of the factors {Ft}Tt=1 given X˜T and Θ
In this subsection we want to draw from
p(F˜T | X˜T,Θ)
assuming that the hyperparameters of the parameter space Θ are given, hence
we describe Bayesian inference on the dynamic evolution of the factors Ft condi-
tional on Xt for t = 1, . . . , T and conditional on Θ. The transformations that are
required to draw the factors have been done in the previous section. The condi-
tional distribution, from which the state vector is generated, can be expressed as
the product of conditional distributions by exploiting the Markov property of state
space models in the following way
p(F˜T | X˜T,Θ) = p(FT | X˜T,Θ)
T−1
∏
t=1
pF(Ft | Ft+1, X˜T,Θ)
The state space model is linear and Gaussian, hence we have:
FT | X˜T,Θ ∼ N(FT|T, PT|T)(A.1)
Ft | Ft+1XT,Θ ∼ N(Ft|t,Ft+1, Pt|t,Ft+1)(A.2)
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with
FT|T = E(FT | X˜T,Θ)(A.3)
PT|T = Cov(FT | X˜T,Θ)(A.4)
Ft|t,Ft+1 = E(Ft | X˜T, Ft+1,Θ) = E(Ft | Ft+1, Ft|t,Θ)(A.5)
Pt|t,Ft+1 = Cov(Ft | X˜T, Ft+1,Θ) = Cov(Ft | Ft+1, Ft|t,Θ)(A.6)
where (A.1) holds for the Kalman filter for t = 1, . . . , T and (A.2) holds for the
Kalman smoother for t = T− 1, T− 2, . . . , 1. Here Ft|t refers to the expectation
of Ft conditional on information dated t or earlier. We can, then, obtain Ft|t
and Pt|t for t = 1, . . . , T by the Kalman Filter, conditional on Θ and the data
X˜T, by applying the formulas in Hamilton (1994), for example. From the last
iteration, we obtain FT|T and PT|T and using those, we can draw Ft. We can go
backwards through the sample, deriving FT−1|T−1,Ft and PT−1|T−1,Ft by Kalman
Filter, drawing FT−1 from (14), and so on for Ft, t = T − 2, T − 3, . . . , 1. A
modification of the Kalman filter procedure, as described in Kim and Nelson
(1999), is necessary when the number of lags p in the FAVAR equation is greater
than 1.
A.4 B.1.3 Conditional density of the parameters Θ given X˜T and
{Ft}Tt=1
Drawing from the conditional distribution of the parameters p(Θ | X˜T, F˜T) can
be blocked into to parts, namely the one referring to the observation equation
and the second part referring to the state equation.
A.4.1 Conditional density of Λ and R
This part refers to observation equation of the state space model which, condi-
tional on the estimated factors and the data, specifies the distribution of Λ and
R. Here we can apply equation by equation OLS in order to obtain Λˆ and Zˆ.
This is feasible due to the fact that the errors are uncorrelated. According to the
specification by BBE we also assume a proper (conjugate) but diffuse inverse
Gamma prior for each σ2n:
Rpriorii ∼ IG(3, 0.001)
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Note that R is assumed to be diagonal. The posterior then has the following form
Rposteriorii | XT, FT ∼ IG(R¯ii, T + 0.001)
where R¯ii = 3+ Zˆ′i Zˆi+ Λˆ
′
i[M
−1
0 + (F
(i)
T
′
F(i)T )
−1]−1Λˆi and M−10 denoting the
variance parameter in the prior on the coefficients of the i-th equation of Λi. The
normalization discussed in section (4) in order to identify the factors and the
loadings separately requires to set M0 = I. Conditional on the drawn value of
Rii the prior on the factor loadings of the i-th equation is:
Λpriori ∼ N (0,RiiM−10 ).
The regressors of the i-th equation are represented by F˜(i)T . The values of Λi
are drawn from the posterior
Λposteriori ∼ N (Λ¯i,RiiM¯−1i )
where Λ¯i = M¯−1i (F
(i)
T
′
FiT)Λˆi and M¯
−1
i (F
(i)
T
′
FiT).
A.4.2 B.1.3.2 Conditional density of vec(Φ) and Σν
The next Gibbs block requires to draw vec(Φ) and Σν conditional on the most
current draws of the factors, the R′iis and Λ
′
is and the data. As the FAVAR
equation has a standard VAR form one can likewise estimate vec(Φˆ) and Σˆν
via equation by equation OLS. We impose a diffuse conjugate Normal-Wishart
prior:
vec(Φ)prior | Σν ∼ N (0,Σν ⊗Ω0)
Σpriorν ∼ IW(Σν,0,K+M+ 2)
which results in the following posterior:
vec(Φ)posterior ∼ N (vec(Φ¯),Σν ⊗ Ω¯)
Σposteriorν ∼ IW(Σ¯ν, T + K+M+ 2)
In the spirit of the Minnesota prior, it is desirable to have a prior which assigns
less impact to more distant lags. Hence, the BBE [2005] specification follows
Kadiyala and Karlsson [1997]. First we draw Σν from the posterior, where Σ¯ν =
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Σν,0+ Vˆ′Vˆ + Φˆ′[Ω0+ (F′T−1FT−1)
−1]−1Φˆ and where Vˆ is the matrix of OLS
residuals. Then, conditional on the draw Σν we draw from the posterior of the co-
efficients where Φ¯ = Ω¯(F′T−1FT−1)Φˆ and Ω¯ = (Ω
−1
0 + (F
′
T−1FT−1))
−1. To
ensure stationarity, we truncate the draws and only accept values forΦ less than
one in absolute values . This block on Kalman filter and smoother and the block
on drawing the parameter space are iterated until convergence is achieved. For
the implementation of the DCNW prior it required to set the diagonal elements
of Σν,0 to the corresponding d-lag univariate autoregressions, σ2i . We construct
the diagonal elements of Ω0 such that the prior variances of the parameter of
the k lagged j’th variable in the i’th equation equals σ2i /kσ
2
j .
12
12For a detailed discussion of the implementation of the prior see the NBER working paper version of BBE
(2004) and Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997).
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B Data
All data are taken from the NBER’s macroeconomic history database. Most of
these data are contemporary and were collected for the business cycle dating
project of Burns and Mitchell (1947). Our dataset includes a total of 164 time
series.
Pos.
NBER
Code
Description TC SA
1 1130 PIG IRON PRODUCTION 5 0
2 4051 INDEX OF THE GENERAL PRICE LEVEL 5 0
3 13012 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK DISCOUNT RATES, SAN FRANCISCO 1 0
4 14125 CURRENCY HELD BY THE PUBLIC 5 1
5 1054 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF MANUFACTURES, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 5 1
6 1055 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF PRODUCERS GOODS 5 1
7 1056 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF CONSUMERS GOOD 5 1
8 1057 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF CONSUMERS GOODS, EXCLUDING AUTOMOBILES 5 1
9 01057A INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF DURABLE GOODS 5 1
10 01057B INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF TRANSIENT GOODS 5 1
11 1058 WHEAT FLOUR PRODUCTION 5 0
12 1060 CORN GRINDINGS 5 0
13 1064 TOTAL MEAT CONSUMPTION 5 0
14 1071 BUTTER CONSUMPTION 5 0
15 1105 PAPER PRODUCTION, ALL GRADES 5 0
16 01125A CRUDE PETROLEUM CONSUMPTION, RUNS TO STILLS 5 0
17 1126 GASOLINE PRODUCTION AT REFINERIES 5 0
18 1131 MERCHANT PIG IRON PRODUCTION 5 1
19 1135 STEEL INGOT PRODUCTION 5 0
20 1144 AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTION, TRUCKS 5 0
21 1148 RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVE SHIPMENTS, DOMESTIC, BY CAR BUILDERS 5 0
22 1149 FREIGHT CAR SHIPMENTS, DOMESTIC 5 0
23 1171 WOODWORKING MACHINERY SHIPMENTS, VALUE 5 0
24 1175 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF MANUFACTURES, TOTAL 5 0
25 01191B INDEX OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION OF FOODSTUFFS AND TOBACCO 5 1
26 1204 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF FUELS 5 1
27 1234 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF DURABLE MANUFACTURES 5 1
28 1260 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF MANUFACTURED FOOD PRODUCTS 5 1
29 3009 FREIGHT CAR SURPLUS 5 1
30 03016A OPERATING REVENUES OF RAILROADS, PASSENGER 5 0
31 03016B OPERATING REVENUES OF RAILROADS, FREIGHT 5 0
32 4001 WHOLESALE PRICE OF WHEAT, CHICAGO, SIX MARKETS 5 0
33 4005 WHOLESALE PRICE OF CORN, CHICAGO 5 0
34 4006 WHOLESALE PRICE OF COTTON, NEW YORK; 10 MARKETS 5 0
35 4007 WHOLESALE PRICE OF CATTLE, CHICAGO 5 0
36 4008 WHOLESALE PRICE OF HOGS, CHICAGO 5 0
37 4015 WHOLESALE PRICE OF COPPER, ELECTROLYTE, NEW YORK 5 0
38 4017 WHOLESALE PRICE OF PIG LEAD, NEW YORK 5 0
39 4030 WHOLESALE PRICE OF GRANULATED SUGAR 5 0
40 4034 WHOLESALE PRICE OF COFFEE 5 0
41 4048 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 5 0
42 4052 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, ALL ITEMS LESS FOOD 5 0
43 4058 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF FARM PRODUCTS 5 0
44 4061 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF FOODS 5 0
45 4064 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICE OF TEXTILES 5 0
46 4066 WHOLESALE PRICES OF METAL AND METAL PRODUCTS 5 0
47 4068 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF BUILDING MATERIALS 5 0
48 4071 INDEX OF RETAIL PRICES OF FOOD AT HOME 5 0
49 4074 WHOLESALE PRICE OF OATS, CHICAGO 5 0
50 4072 COST OF LIVING INDEX 5 0
51 4079 WHOLESALE PRICE OF CRUDE PETROLEUM, AT WELLS 5 0
52 4092 WHOLESALE PRICE OF SLAB ZINC 5 0
53 4099 WHOLESALE PRICE OF COMMON BRICKS, DOMESTIC, NEW YORK 5 0
54 4128 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, ALL ITEMS 5 0
55 4129 WHOLESALE PRICE OF TEA 5 0
36
Pos. NBER
Code
Description TC SA
56 4134 WHOLESALE PRICE OF STRUCTURAL STEEL 5 0
57 4181 WHOLESALE PRICE OF STEEL RAILS 5 0
58 4189 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF INDUSTRIAL COMMODITIES, BABSON 5 0
59 4202 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF 15 SENSITIVE INDUSTRIAL RAW 5 0
60 06002A INDEX OF DEPARTMENT STORE SALES 5 1
61 06002B THE PHYSICAL VOLUME OF DEPARTMENT STORE SALES 5 1
62 6008 SALES BY GROCERY CHAIN STORES 5 0
63 6009 VARIETY CHAIN STORE SALES, ADJUSTED FOR TREND, PRICE 5 1
64 6029 INDEX OF ORDERS FOR MACHINE TOOLS AND FORGING MACHINERY 5 0
65 6058 INDEX OF TOTAL ADVERTISING 5 1
66 6059 INDEX OF WHOLESALE SALES OF SHOES 5 1
67 7001 DOMESTIC EXPORTS OF CRUDE FOODSTUFFS 5 0
68 7002 DOMESTIC EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURED FOODSTUFFS 5 0
69 7004 DOMESTIC EXPORTS OF SEMI-MANUFACTURES 5 0
70 7005 DOMESTIC EXPORTS OF FINISHED MANUFACTURES 5 0
71 7012 IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION OF CRUDE FOOD STUFFS 5 0
72 7013 IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURED FOODSTUFFS 5 0
73 7014 IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION OF CRUDE MATERIALS 5 0
74 7015 IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION OF SEMI-MANUFACTURES 5 0
75 7016 IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION OF FINISHED MANUFACTURES 5 0
76 7023 TOTAL EXPORTS 5 0
77 7028 TOTAL IMPORTS 5 0
78 8010B PRODUCTION WORKER EMPLOYMENT, MANUFACTURING, TOTAL 5 0
79 8014 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, PAPER AND PRINTING 5 1
80 8015 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS 5 1
81 8016 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, STONE, CLAY AND GLASS PRODUCTS 5 1
82 8017 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, LUMBER AND PRODUCTS 5 1
83 8018 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, MACHINERY 5 1
84 8046 AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS, REPRESENTATIVE FACTORIES 5 0
85 8061 INDEX OF COMPOSITE WAGES 5 0
86 8069 INDEX OF AGGREGATE WEEKLY PAYROLLS, PRODUCTION WORKERS TOTAL MANU-
FACTURING
5 0
87 8071 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, TEXTILES 5 0
88 8072 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, PAPER AND PRINTING 5 0
89 8073 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS 5 0
90 8074 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, STONE CLAY AND GLASS 5 0
91 8075 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS - LUMBER AND PRODUCTS 5 0
92 8076 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, MACHINERY 5 0
93 8078 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, NEW YORK STATE FACTORIES 5 0
94 8088 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT-BAKING 5 0
95 8101 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, LEATHER AND MANUFACTURES 5 1
96 8104 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, PAPER AND PULP 5 1
97 8106 INDEX OF EMPLOYMENT, HARDWARE 5 1
98 8110 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, CANE SUGAR REFINING 5 0
99 8112 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, BAKING 5 0
100 8114 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, TOBACCO MANUFACTURES 5 0
101 8145 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, AUTOMOBILES 5 0
102 8261 AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS, MANUFACTURING, TOTAL 5 0
103 11001 BOND SALES, PAR VALUE 5 0
104 11005 AMERICAN RAILROAD STOCK PRICES 5 0
105 11009 INDUSTRIAL STOCK PRICE INDEX, DOW-JONES 5 0
106 11025 INDEX OF ALL COMMON STOCK PRICES, COWLES COMMISSION AND S& P CORPORA-
TION
5 0
107 12002A INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY 5 0
108 12003 INDEX OF AMERICAN BUSINESS ACTIVITY 5 0
109 12004 INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND TRADE 5 1
110 12007 INDEX OF AMERICAN BUSINESS ACTIVITY 5 0
111 12009A INDEX OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY, PITTSBURGH 5 1
112 12009 INDEX OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETINGS 5 1
113 12013 BANK CLEARINGS, DAILY AVERAGE 5 0
114 13001 CALL MONEY RATES, MIXED COLLATERAL 1 0
115 13002 COMMERCIAL PAPER RATES, NEW YORK CITY 5 0
116 13003 NINETY DAY TIME-MONEY RATES ON STOCK EXCHANGE LOANS 1 0
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Pos. NBER
Code
Description TC SA
117 13004 RATES ON CUSTOMER LOANS, NEW YORK CITY 1 0
118 13005 RATES ON CUSTOMERS LOANS, NORTHERN AND WESTERN CITIES 1 0
119 13006 BANK RATES ON CUSTOMERS LOANS, SOUTHERN AND WESTERN CITIES 1 0
120 13007 BANKER S ACCEPTANCE RATES, NEW YORK CITY 1 0
121 13008 INTEREST RATES ON FEDERAL LAND BANK LOANS, TWELVE FEDERAL LAND BANKS 1 0
122 13009 DISCOUNT RATES, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK 1 0
123 13010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK DISCOUNT RATES, MINNEAPOLIS 1 0
124 13011 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK DISCOUNT RATE, DALLAS 1 0
125 13021 INDEX OF YIELDS OF HIGH GRADE CORPORATE AND MUNICIPAL BONDS 1 0
126 13023 INDEX OF YIELDS OF HIGH GRADE MUNICIPAL BONDS 1 0
127 13024 YIELDS OF HIGH GRADE RAILROAD BONDS 1 0
128 13025 INDEX OF YIELDS OF HIGH GRADE PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS 1 0
129 13026 YIELD ON HIGH GRADE INDUSTRIAL BONDS, AAA RATING 1 0
130 13030 WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF OPEN MARKET RATES, NEW YORK CITY 1 0
131 13031 BANK RATES ON CUSTOMER LOANS, LEADING CITIES 1 0
132 13032 TOTAL RATES CHARGED CUSTOMERS AND OPEN MARKET RATES, COMBINED 1 0
133 13033 YIELD ON LONG-TERM UNITED STATES BONDS 1 0
134 13035 YIELDS ON CORPORATE BONDS, HIGHEST RATING 1 0
135 13036 YIELDS ON CORPORATE BONDS, LOWEST RATING 1 0
136 13048 DIVIDEND YIELD OF PREFERRED STOCK ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 1 0
137 14062 TOTAL GOLD RESERVES OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
138 14063 CASH RESERVES OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
139 14064 RESERVES HELD AT FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS, ALL MEMBER BANKS 5 0
140 14065 NOTES IN CIRCULATION, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
141 14066 TOTAL BILLS AND SECURITIES HELD BY FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
142 14067 BILLS DISCOUNTED, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
143 14069 GOVERNMENT SECURITIES HELD, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
144 14070 TOTAL DEPOSITS, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
145 14072 RATIO OF RESERVES TO NOTE AND DEPOSIT LIABILITIES, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
146 14076 MONETARY GOLD STOCK 5 0
147 14078 NET DEMAND DEPOSITS, REPORTING MEMBER BANKS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 5 0
148 14079 TIME DEPOSITS, REPORTING MEMBER BANKS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 5 0
149 14080 CURRENCY HELD BY THE TREASURY 5 1
150 14086 PERCENTAGE OF RESERVES HELD TO RESERVES REQUIRED, ALL MEMBER BANKS,
FRB SYSTEM
5 0
151 14121 NEW YORK CITY 5 0
152 14126 VAULT CASH, ALL BANKS EXCEPT FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
153 14127 INVESTMENTS OTHER THAN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES, REPORTING
FEDERAL RESERVE MEMBER BANKS IN 101 LEADING CITIES
5 0
154 14135 TOTAL CURRENCY OUTSIDE THE TREASURY AND FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS, END OF
MONTH
5 0
155 14137 GOLD HELD IN THE TREASURY AND FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS, END OF 5 0
156 14144 MONEY STOCK, COMMERICAL BANKS PLUS CURRENCY HELD BY PUBLIC 5 0
157 14145 TOTAL DEPOSITS, ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS 5 1
158 14172 ADJUSTED DEMAND DEPOSITS, ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS 5 1
159 14173 DEPOSITS IN MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS AND POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM, END OF
MONTH
5 0
160 14174 ADJ. DEMAND DEPOSITS, ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS,CURRENCY HELD BY PUBLIC 5 1
161 14175 ADJ. DEMAND DEPOSITS, ALL BANKS,TOTAL TIME DEPOSITS, CURRENCY HELD BY
PUBLIC
5 1
162 14178 RATIO OF CURRENCY HELD BY THE PUBLIC TO ADJUSTED DEMAND DEPOSITS, TIME
DEPOSITS, ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS, PLUS CURRENCY HELD BY THE PUBLIC
5 1
163 14190 PERCENT CHANGE IN TOTAL MONEY SUPPLY, MONTH-TO-MONTH CHANGE 1 1
164 14195 MONEY STOCK, MONTH-TO-MONTH CHANGE 1
SA = 0: no seasonal adjustment or SA in the source; SA = 1: seasonally adjusted
by the authors. TC = 1: no transformation; TC = 5: 1st difference of logs.
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C Tables
Table 3: Estimated R2s from regressions of individual series on FAVAR (DR
model).
Description R2 Description R2
PR IMNF 1 Production (durable mnfct) 0.71
CPI 1 Industrial Production/Trade 0.69
DR 1 Industrial activity 0.68
Total rates charged 1 Business activity growth 0.67
Bankers rates (Customer loans) 1 Index of WSP: 0.61
Open market rates 0.99 WSP: Foods 0.6
CommPR 0.99 General price level 0.56
Yield:Corporate bonds 0.99 Employment: Machinery 0.54
Yields: Corporate bonds 0.99 CPI less food 0.53
Rates on custom. Loans 0.99 PR IPTG 0.53
Rates on custom. Loans (SW) 0.99 Pig Iron 0.51
90day time to money 0.99 Employment: Manufacturing 0.51
Rates on custom. Loans (NW) 0.99 Business activity pittsburgh 0.5
Yields: Public utility 0.98 Index manufacturing prod. 0.5
Banker s accept. Rate 0.98 Steel ingot 0.5
DR Dallas 0.98 Cost of Living index 0.49
DR SF 0.97 Payrolls wkly: Manufacturing 0.49
DR Minneapolis 0.96 Factory payrolls: Machinery 0.49
Yields: Industrial bonds 0.96 Factory payrolls: steel 0.47
Call money rate 0.95 Employment: Steel 0.47
Yield: Long-term bonds 0.95 PR IPDCG 0.45
Yields: Railroad bonds 0.95 WSP Industrial (sensitive Raw) 0.44
Dividend yields 0.95 WSP: Textiles 0.44
Yields: Munic Interest rates FED bank
loans 0.91 PR IPCGLA 0.4
PR IPRGD 0.88 Employment: Paper 0.39
WSP: food 0.87 WSP Industrial commodities 0.39
PR IPDG 0.81 Employment: Lumber 0.37
Yield:Corporate bonds (LG) 0.78 WSP: Building material 0.37
Index business activity 0.77 Employment: Steel 0.37
Data show the variance decomposition of the factors through the estimated R2s
for each indicator series based on 4 extracted factors.
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Table 4: Forecast error variance decomposition of a contractionary mone-
tary policy shock
Commercial Paper Rate Model
Horizon 0 1 2 3 6 12 24 48
CommPR 5 6 7 7 6 6 5 5
FRB Industrial Production 5 6 8 8 8 9 9 10
CPI inflation 65 48 46 44 43 43 43 42
S&P 500 9 11 13 14 15 15 16 16
Wages 12 14 15 15 15 15 16 16
Orders of Machinery Tools 9 13 14 18 18 20 20 20
Discount Rate Model
Horizon 0 1 2 3 6 12 24 48
Discount Rate 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6
FRB Industrial Production 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 9
CPI inflation 94 56 53 52 48 46 45 43
S&P 500 5 6 6 7 8 9 9 10
Wages 10 11 11 11 11 12 12 13
Orders of Machinery Tools 6 7 7 9 10 10 11 11
M0 Model
Horizon 0 1 2 3 6 12 24 48
M0 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3
FRB Industrial Production 15 18 19 18 18 20 21 20
CPI inflation 54 38 38 37 37 37 36 35
S&P 500 16 18 20 22 22 22 22 21
Wages 10 10 12 12 12 13 12 12
Orders of Machinery Tools 18 17 20 23 23 23 23 22
M1 Model
Horizon 0 1 2 3 6 12 24 48
M1 17 19 19 18 17 18 17 16
FRB Industrial Production 16 17 17 17 17 17 16 16
CPI inflation 89 60 55 54 50 48 47 42
S&P 500 19 20 21 22 22 22 23 23
Wages 16 17 18 18 17 17 16 16
Orders of Machinery Tools 22 23 26 27 26 26 26 27
M2 Model
Horizon 0 1 2 3 6 12 24 48
M2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3
FRB Industrial Production 4 4 5 6 6 6 7 7
CPI inflation 87 48 45 40 38 37 37 36
S&P 500 5 6 6 8 8 9 9 10
Wages 10 9 11 10 11 10 11 11
Orders of Machinery Tools 7 7 8 9 10 11 11 12
Percentage forecast error variance decompositions of a contractionary monetary policy shock for
the 3 models considered. The respective 3 blocks report the results for the discount rate model,
commercial paper rates model, M0 model the M1 model and the M2 model. The variables consid-
ered are the same as for the impulse response analysis, namely the Discount Rate, the commercial
Paper rate, the growth in FRB index for production in manufacturing, the CPI inflation, S&P is the
Standard and Poor 500 index and the index of orders in Machinery and Tools. The values denote
the variance explained in the respective series due to a monetary policy shock in percent based on
the median of the posterior draws.
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D Figures, Whole Observation Period 1919-1939
D.1 Reduced Form Results
Figure 1: Extracted Factors with 95% probability bands
In order to access the uncertainty associated with the sampled posterior factors we report the 95 % proba-
bility bands around the posterior median of the respective sampled factors. These are fairly tight indicating
a low degree of sampling uncertainty. We furthermore checked the convergence by monitoring the sampler
visually through trace plots. Figure (3)) shows how the parameter estimates evolve in the sampling process
and helps to check whether there are jumps in the level of the respective parameter. Furthermore we plot-
ted the first half of the kept draws against the second half to check whether the sampler has converged
and whether the whole density of the distribution is represented. Figure (2) shows hardly any deviation,
suggesting that the sampler converged already in the first half.
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D.2 The Surprise Component of Monetary Policy
Figure 4: IRF and FEVD to Monetary Policy Shock, DR model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
48
Figure 5: IRF and FEVD to Monetary Policy Shock, CommPR model, Full Sam-
ple Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
49
Figure 6: IRF and FEVD to Monetary Policy Shock, M0 model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 7: IRF and FEVD to a Monetary Policy Shock in the M1 model for
Fullsample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02 identified with sign restriction
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Figure 8: IRF and FEVD to a Monetary Policy Shock in the M2 model for
Fullsample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02 identified with sign restriction
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D.3 Identifying the Monetary Policy Reaction Function
Figure 9: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Supply Shock, DR model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 10: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Supply Shock, CommPR model, Full
Sample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 11: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Supply Shock, M0 model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 12: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Supply Shock, M1 model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
56
Figure 13: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Supply Shock, M2 model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 14: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Demand Shock, DR model, Full
Sample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 15: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Demand Shock, CommPR model,
Full Sample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 16: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Demand Shock, M0 model, Full
Sample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 17: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Demand Shock, M1 model, Full
Sample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 18: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Demand Shock, M2 model, Full
Sample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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